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INTRODUCTION
For many years, New York State's enterprise corruption law was grounded
in a legal error. Recently, the New York Court of Appeals has sought to correct
some of the doctrinal consequences of this mistake. Unfortunately, the court's
solution has left the law unmoored from its original purpose, perpetuated is-
sues of notice and legality, and heightened the risk of overcriminalization. This
Comment reconstructs and analyzes these developments. It then turns to the
practice of a lone (and heretofore ignored) New York State trial court judge as
a potential solution to the legal and policy problems created by the current state
of the law.
The argument proceeds in six parts. Part I demonstrates how the federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) - the inspiration
for New York State's enterprise corruption law-was designed to respond to
the special problems that the Mafia posed for traditional law enforcement. Part
II explains how New York legislators, concerned about the way the federal law
threatened fair trial principles, sought to limit the reach of their state analog,
the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA). Part III shows how New York State
courts eliminated many of those limits as a result of an error of statutory inter-
pretation, creating bad doctrine. Part IV examines the way the Court of Appeals
has recently tried to fix this flawed jurisprudence. Part V details some of the
problems with the court's solution. Part VI proposes the use of section
210.40(2) motions under the New York Criminal Procedure Law as an alterna-
tive by which the judiciary can correct its long-standing error. Finally, a short
conclusion suggests the broader implications of this possible reform.
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I. RICO: A NEW CRIME FOR AN OLD CRIMINAL
The crime of enterprise corruption owes its origins to the Mafia crisis of the
mid-twentieth century. Following World War II, the Mob was powerful and
hard to prosecute,' operating through lucrative schemes, of which only some
components were obviously criminal. For example, the Lucchese crime family
ran a protection racket in the Long Island sanitation industry, skimming
$200,000 to $40o,ooo a year off of garbage collection fees.2 The scheme relied
on some recognizable crimes like bid rigging and intimidation. However, at its
center was an apparently legitimate trade association, which the Mob used to
control prices and collect payments.'
Schemes like the Lucchese's posed three related problems for law enforce-
ment officials. First, they insulated higher-ups from serious criminal charges
by distancing them from easy-to-prove crimes.' Second, and counter-
intuitively, they provided law enforcement with plenty of other criminals to
prosecute besides the scheme's orchestrators, creating the illusion of enforce-
ment authority without the ability to reach the real underlying crime.' These
difficulties can both be understood as manifestations of a third, deeper prob-
lem: the organization of the Mob made it resistant to traditional criminal pros-
ecution. Traditionally, law enforcement sought to pin individual crimes on in-
dividual criminals.6 But most individuals in a complex criminal organization
like the Mafia were interchangeable. If one low-level Mafioso were jailed, an-
other would simply take his place. The core crime family -and with it, the
criminal scheme - remained out of reach.
To address these problems, in 1970, Congress enacted an innovative new
statute, RICO, criminalizing the use of thuggery and illicit schemes to infiltrate
1. See SELWYN RAAB, FIVE FAMILIES: THE RISE, DECLINE, AND RESURGENCE OF AMERICA'S MOST
POWERFUL MAFIA EMPIRES 156-57, 167 (2005). By the mid-196os, the Department of Justice
estimated that "organized crime's profits were equal [to] those of the [United States']
ten largest industrial corporations combined." Id. at 156 (emphasis omitted). Following
Raab's own practice, this Comment uses the terms "Mafia" and "Mob" interchangeably
to refer to traditional La Cosa Nostra crime families. See id. at xi; cf Organized
Crime, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://wWW2.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/cnindex.htm
[http://perma.cc/8G3N-FANG] (distinguishing precisely between different branches of the
American Mafia).
2. RAAB, supra note 1, at 239.
3. Id. at 238-39.
4. Id. at 177.
5. See id. at 181-82.




legitimate businesses.' This new law allowed prosecutors to go after the Mob
not in spite of its complex organization, but through it.' Focusing on how the
Mafia made its money allowed prosecutors to pursue not only the low-level
street enforcers who committed traditional crimes, but also the captains who
planned them and the bosses who indirectly profited.
However, the very features of the law that made it useful against organized
crime also raised serious concerns about the violation of defendants' basic
rights. Controversially, RICO appeared to criminalize "being a criminal" - a
status instead of an act.' Although this seemed less problematic when the tar-
gets were dangerous crime families, federal prosecutors soon used RICO to
pursue a variety of non-Mafia defendants.o Some feared prosecutorial over-
reach."
II. OCCA: NEW YORK'S "BABY RICO"
The Mafia had long been a significant presence in New York,12 and by the
1980s the state was grappling with an epidemic of organized crime." Vhen
legislators finally created a state counterpart to RICO in 1986,14 they attempted
7. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2012)).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (2012).
9. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 661,
661-62, 692-695 (1987).
io. G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts To Rewrite
RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God -Is This the End of RICO?," 43
VAND. L. REv. 851, 855 & 1.12 (1990).
n1. See, e.g., Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.
REV. 165, 169-71 (1980).
12. See generally VIRGILW. PETERSON, THE MOB: 200 YEARS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEWYORK
(1983) (recounting the history of the Mafia in New York).
13. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert Abrams, N.Y. Attorney Gen., to Mario Cuomo, N.Y.
Governor 1 (July 19, 1986) [hereinafter Abrams Memorandum] (on file with author) (high-
lighting "the staggering dimensions and broad tentacles" that "organized crime as it func-
tions in New York State" had developed); Letter from Edward I. Koch, N.Y.C. Mayor, to
Mario Cuomo, N.Y. Governor (July 28, 1986) (on file with author) (urging the enactment
of OCCA to help "alleviate the desperate situation" in which New York found itself unable to
adequately address its Mafia threat).
14. See Memorandum Filed with Assembly Bill Number 11726 from Mario Cuomo, N.Y. Gover-
nor 2 (July 24, 1986) [hereinafter Cuomo Memorandum] (on file with author) (noting that,
in the absence of a New York law on enterprise corruption, state investigators were forced
"to turn over their evidence to federal prosecutors"). See generally Jason D. Reichelt, Note,
Stalking the Enterprise Criminal: State RICO and the Liberal Interpretation of the Enterprise Ele-
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to correct for two of the federal law's perceived deficiencies. First, state legisla-
tors worried that RICO undermined the guarantee to a fair trial because it sev-
ered criminality from the commission of criminal acts." Second, and more pro-
foundly, legislators feared that RICO was overly broad and potentially applica-
applicable to defendants undeserving of its heightened sanctions. 1 6
The crime they invented, called "enterprise corruption" in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1986 (OCCA)," was designed to provide an avenue for
prosecuting the Mob while responding to these concerns." The legislature in-
tended enterprise corruption to apply to a narrower range of cases than RICO 9
and to offer defendants greater protections.2 0
OCCA's most significant innovation, a radical departure from RICO, was
the way it defined the crime.21 Both RICO and OCCA sought to reach Mafiosi
through their involvement with an enterprise.22 OCCA, however, additionally
required that alleged criminals specifically participate in a criminal enterprise,23
defined as "a group of persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in crim-
inal conduct, associated in an ascertainable structure distinct from a pattern of
ment, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 224, 230-33 (1995) (discussing the enactment of state RICO laws
in the 198os).
15. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel L. Feldman, N.Y. State Assembly Member, to Evan A. Davis,
Counsel to the Governor 1 (July 18, 1986) (on file with author) ("It has taken those four
years [of drafting] to refine [OCCA] to the point at which it achieves its purposes without
raising some of the problems of fair trial for which the federal law (RICO) has been criti-
cized."). Daniel Feldman was one of the Act's sponsors. Id.
16. See, e.g., Letter from Melvin H. Miller, Chairman, N.Y. State Assembly Comm. on Codes, to
Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor 2-3 (July 16, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Miller];
see also infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
17. 1986 N.Y. Laws 2507.
18. See, e.g., Abrams Memorandum, supra note 13, at 2 (describing how OCCA seeks to "over-
come flaws and eliminate potential abuses alleged to exist in the federal RICO statute," in
particular "the concern that the new powers given to prosecutors might be inappropriately
used").
ig. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAw § 460.oo (McKinney 2016) (noting that " [b]ecause of its more
rigorous definitions, [OCCA] will not apply to some situations encompassed within compa-
rable statutes in other jurisdictions").
20. See, e.g., Letter from Miller, supra note 16, at 2-3 (discussing how OCCA seeks to protect de-
fendants from the "prejudicial joinder" they may face under RICO).
21. Accord Steven L. Kessler, And a Little Child Shall Lead Them: New York's Organized Crime
Control Act of 1986, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 797, 810 (1990) (noting that "OCCA's requirement
that each defendant be associated with a criminal enterprise is probably the most fundamen-
tal distinction between OCCA and other RICO-type statutes").
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012); PENAL § 460.20.




criminal activity, and with a continuity of existence, structure and criminal
purpose beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents."24 In practice, the
"criminal purpose" element of the law has not had much bite,25 leaving two
prongs for courts to grapple with: an "ascertainable structure" and a "continui-
ty of existence."2 6
Defining the crime this way responded to both of the legislature's concerns
about RICO. It protected defendants by requiring prosecutors to affirmatively
establish that the defendants had participated in or sought to advance the
affairs of a criminal enterprise.2 7 This restored the nexus between wrongful ac-
tion and punishment. It also limited the law's reach by restricting the applica-
tion of OCCA to defendants who were explicitly participating in such enter-
prises. This narrowed the law by preventing it from potentially reaching
anyone engaged in a pattern of criminal activity.
These were not the only changes OCCA's drafters inserted into their "baby
RICO."28 They further cabined the law by incorporating detailed legislative
findings about the Act's purpose into the text of the statute, along with provi-
sions requiring that it only be used in line with those findings.2 9 Further,
whereas the federal law required proof of two predicate criminal acts to consti-
tute a pattern of criminal activity, OCCA required three.o Finally, legislators
incorporated a host of changes to the New York State Criminal Procedure Law
to tweak the way OCCA prosecutions unfold and offer defendants additional
protections."
24. Id. § 460.10(3).
25. Even a very general purpose, such as " [r]ealizing an economic benefit," has been found to
qualify "as a common purpose under the enterprise corruption statute." People v. Joseph
Stevens & Co., No. 2394/2009, 2011 WL 1757051, *29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2011) (unre-
ported disposition) (quoting People v. Pustilnik, No. 2759/2005, 2007 WL 674116, at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2007)). The Court of Appeals has also allowed a criminal purpose to
be inferred from the actions of defendants. See People v. Kancharla, 23 N.Y 3d 294, 305
(2014).
26. PENAL § 460.10(3).
27. Id. § 460.20(2).
28. K essler, supra note 21, at 797-98 ("OCCA [was] also known as 'Baby RICO' or 'Little RI-
CO."').
29. PENAL § 460.oo. For further discussion, see infra Parts V, VI.
30. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012) (defining "pattern of racketeering activity" to require "at
least two acts of racketeering activity"), with PENAL § 460.10(4) (defining "pattern of crimi-
nal activity" to mean conduct requiring "three or more criminal acts").
31. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.40(1)(d), 200.65, 210.40(2), 300.1o(6), 310.50(4)
(McKinney 2016); see also infra Part VI. One such procedural check requires the explicit con-
sent of the district attorney for any prosecution under OCCA. PENAL § 460.60(2); CRIM.
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Underlying these decisions was a felt need to restrict OCCA to criminals
who posed the same kinds of enforcement problems for traditional law en-
forcement as the Mafia. As Assemblyman Melvin Miller, one of the bill's spon-
sors, put it, in what has become the most influential statement of legislative in-
tent underlying the Act: "[T]he extraordinary sanctions allowed under
[OCCA] should be reserved for those who not only commit crimes but do so as
part of an organized criminal enterprise. Present law [without OCCA] is ade-
quate to punish ordinary white-collar crime... ."32 And although OCCA's
drafters always understood that organized criminal enterprises might include
more than just Italian crime families," the Mafia was their main target.34
The application of the law initially stayed within these bounds, and where
prosecutors overreached, the judiciary disciplined them. For example, when the
Manhattan district attorney charged a pair of union officials under OCCA for
passing bribes," the court threw the indictment out with a forceful condemna-
tion: there was "no question" that the defendants met the criteria for prosecu-
tion under the federal law, but "OCCA was designed to target certain criminal
activities more precisely defined and with less sweep than RICO."3 6
PROC. § 200.65. Courts do not appear to have worried overly much about this provision, ar-
ticulating a presumption in favor of the prosecutor even where the required attestation giv-
ing consent was not timely filed, and suggesting that there may be no remedy to improper
filing at all. See People v. Thomas, 866 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (App. Div. 2008) (relying in part on
the "presumption of regularity" to find the required consent for an enterprise corruption
prosecution); 6 RICHARD A. GREENBERG ET AL., NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES: NEW YoRK
CRIMINAL LAw § 36:8, n.11 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing People v. Marquez, N.Y. L.J., July 22,
1996, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.)).
32. Letter from Miller, supra note 16, at 2. For this letter's influence in the courts, see, for exam-
ple, People v. Yarmy, 651 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1996), which quotes Miller's letter to
establish the limits of the statute's "target group [as] envisioned by the legislature." See also
People v. Moscatiello, 566 N.Y.S.2d 823, 824-25 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (quoting Miller's letter to
show that the legislature intended the "criminal enterprise" requirement to limit the statute's
application).
33. See PENAL § 460.oo (clarifying that "the concept of criminal enterprise should not be limited
to traditional criminal syndicates or crime families").
34. See, e.g., Abrams Memorandum, supra note 13, at 3 (calling OCCA "a major achievement for
[New York State] in its efforts to attack organized crime,' including "Mob infiltration of,
and influence in, legitimate industries"); Cuomo Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2-3 (not-
ing RICO's success at targeting "traditional organized crime families" and anticipating that
OCCA would be similarly successful).
35. Moscatiello, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 823.




III. THE LAW SLIPS ITS BINDS
Over the next twenty-five years, however, New York State courts expanded
the definition of "criminal enterprise," ignoring OCCA's original text and pur-
pose. This divergence originated with People v. Wakefield Financial Corp." In
Wakefield, a number of traders at separate firms had been indicted under OCCA
for collaborating to fraudulently set stock prices. No Mafia connections were
alleged, nor were participants directed by bosses otherwise beyond the reach of
the law. Indeed, all of the participants faced not only enterprise corruption
charges but also many other criminal counts, including multiple counts of falsi-
fying business records and grand larceny." Nevertheless, the court declined to
dismiss the enterprise corruption charge." Reasoning that OCCA should apply
"where it is alleged that a structure is established to engage in continu-
ing ... criminal activity,"'40 the court sought to satisfy the law's narrow, multi-
pronged definition of "criminal enterprise" with a more flexible and unitary
"system of authority" test drawn from federal RICO trials.4 1 Under the court's
new "system of authority" standard, borrowed from federal law, the govern-
ment no longer needed to show, distinctly, that an alleged criminal enterprise
had an ascertainable structure and a continuity of existence.42 Rather, the state
could focus on showing that a group of criminals were bound together by a
system of authority. The system of authority would speak to both the criminal
enterprise's structure and its continuity.43
The Wakefield decision is problematic on three counts. First, as a technical
matter, it rests on an error of statutory interpretation. The Wakefield court re-
lied on the fact that OCCA had been heavily influenced by RICO44 and that its
37. 590 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
38. Id. at 384.
39. Id. at 388-89.
40. Id. at 390.
41. Id. at 389 (citing prior federal rulings in United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842 (8th Cit.
1987); United States v. Lemm, 68o F.2d 1193 (8th Cit. 1982); United States v. Bledsoe, 674
F.2d 647 (8th Cit. 1982)).
42. See, e.g., People v. Moscatiello, 566 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (dismissing an enter-
prise corruption indictment because, "having reviewed the Grand Jury minutes," the court
found that the defendants "were associated in no structure and certainly not one with a
scope of existence beyond their criminal acts").
43. Wakefield, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (drawing on proof of a "system of authority" to establish "an
ascertainable structure" and the existence of a "continuing enterprise").
44. Id. at 388 (noting that, in designing OCCA, "the experience of the federal courts with RICO
was examined closely by the legislature"); see also Ethan Brett Gerber, Note, 'A RICO You
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drafters had apparently borrowed the law's concept of criminal enterprise45 and
even some of its definitional language from federal RICO cases.46 Ordinarily,
under the so-called Lorillard rule, when a legislature borrows statutory lan-
guage from another jurisdiction, it is also understood to borrow extant inter-
pretations of that language by the other jurisdiction's courts.47 This seems to be
Can't Refuse": New York's Organized Crime Control Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 995 (1988)
("New York's definition of criminal enterprise has been greatly influenced by judicial inter-
pretations of RICO.").
45. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.10(3) (McKinney 2016) (requiring that a "criminal enter-
prise" under OCCA be "distinct from a pattern of criminal activity"), with United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) ("[U]nder RICO, the Government must prove both the
existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern of racketeering activity.' . . . The 'en-
terprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is separate and apart from the pattern
of activity in which it engages.").
46. Compare PENAL § 460.10(3) (defining a "criminal enterprise" under OCCA as "a group of
persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in criminal conduct, associated in an ascer-
tainable structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activity, and with a continuity of exist-
ence, structure and criminal purpose beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents"),
with Lemm, 68o F.2d at 1198 (holding that an "enterprise" under RICO is a group of persons
with "(1) [a] common or shared purpose; (2) some continuity of structure and personnel;
and (3) an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of
racketeering").
47. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (" [W]here, as here, Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had
knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the
new statute."). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEG-
ISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 858-66 (5 th ed. 2014) (discussing
Lorillard); 2B NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 52:2 (7 th ed. 2015) (describing the presumption that "[w]hen a state leg-
islature adopts a statute which is identical or similar to one in another [jurisdiction], courts
of the adopting state usually adopt the original jurisdiction's construction"); William N.
Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67, 79 (1989) (discussing the Lo-
rillard rule).
To be clear, OCCA borrowed from federal case law interpreting RICO and not the lan-
guage of the underlying statute. This might make the Wakefield court's adoption of federal
law seem more understandable. After all, if the statutes' drafters used the federal court's own
language, surely they must have intended it to mean what the federal courts themselves
meant. However compelling this argument in the abstract, it is inapposite here. OCCA's
drafters were familiar not only with the text of RICO, but the interpretation it had been giv-
en by federal courts. See Kessler, supra note 21, at 799 (noting that "New York legisla-
tors ... sift[ed] through more than fifteen years of RICO history" to draft their bill). They
nevertheless explicitly rejected the reach and formulation of federal law. See supra text ac-
companying notes 15-36. And New York State courts understood this. See, e.g., Moscatiello,
566 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (rejecting an indictment under OCCA that, the court asserted, would
have been appropriate under RICO). Given these circumstances, the Wakefield court's deci-




how the Wakefield court read OCCA's provisions on criminal enterprise48 since
New York borrowed language from a federal case, the meaning of that lan-
guage must be the same as that found in federal law. However, it is well estab-
lished that the Lorillard rule should not apply where there are manifest and
substantial differences in public policy between the two jurisdictions.4 9 That
exception should have controlled here. Although New York legislators adapted
federal language, their purpose was fundamentally different. As they repeatedly
articulated, and as OCCA's text makes explicit, OCCA was meant to have a less
expansive reach than RICO and to demand more of prosecutors.so The Wake-
field court was therefore wrong to import the federal standard into New York
law.
Second, and largely as a result of this mistake, the court stripped away the
protections the narrow definition of "criminal enterprise" had offered. As in-
terpreted by the Wakefield court, OCCA could reach any criminal operation in-
volving a system of authority." Most criminal schemes with more than a single
actor, however, involve some system of authority. But OCCA was not intended
to reach all cases of group criminality. As its text and drafters made clear, and as
its legislative history shows, it was supposed to reach criminals who resisted
traditional prosecution in the same way as the Mafia.52 Under Wakefield, OCCA
and explicitly from the language of RICO, the federal interpretation the Wakefield court
adopted was groundless: it took as the gloss of one statute (OCCA) the interpretation of a
completely different statute (RICO).
In any case, the logic of the public policy exception to Lorillard applies with equal force
to borrowings of statutory and judicial language. See infra note 49.
48. See Wakefield, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (reaching its decision by "[d]rawing an analogy from the
federal RICO statute" and relying on citations to federal cases from the Third, Fifth, and
Eighth Circuits).
49. See, canonically, Zerbe v. State, 583 P.2d 845, 847 (Alaska 1978), which discusses some of the
many limits on the rule of borrowed statutes, noting that, even in its strongest form, the Lo-
rillard rule should be "a presumption" that is "in any event, not conclusive." See also Zerbe v.
State, 578 P.2d 597, 599-601 (Alaska 1978), overruled on other grounds by Kinegak v. State
Dep't Corr., 129 P.3 d 887 (Alaska 20o6) (rejecting various federal court interpretations of
legislative language adopted by the state of Alaska because those interpretations were not
persuasive and against the state's own public policy); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CAS-
ES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC PoLICY 1077-80
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing Zerbe); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 47, § 52:2 1-30 (summariz-
ing case law across jurisdictions that qualifies when original jurisdiction interpretations
should be adopted).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 15-36.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
52. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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could be used expansively, despite the fact that the statute's terms demanded it
be used restrictively.
Third, this deviation led to confused jurisprudence in the lower New York
courts. OCCA had set up exacting standards for determining what kind of
conduct it covered. But the Wakefield court's mushy RICO-based test drew al-
ternative, unclear lines. For applying the law to concrete cases, it proved plainly
inadequate."
IV. FROM WAKEFIELD TO KESCHNER: ENTERPRISE CORRUPTION
LAW TODAY
In response to this confusion, the New York judiciary has recently sought
to redefine the meaning of "criminal enterprise." In a series of opinions over the
past four years-culminating in a decision issued in the summer of 2015-the
New York Court of Appeals has articulated a new standard to replace Wake-
field's "system of authority" test: "excess capacity."54 The new test acknowledges
that " [t] he days of traditional organized crime families," with their hierarchies
of godfathers, capos, and soldiers, "seem to be fading."" The legislature's real
concern, the court correctly noted, was with "[tihose enterprises [that] were
understood to present a distinct evil by reason of their unique capacity to plan
and carry out sophisticated crimes on an ongoing basis while insulating their
leadership from detection and prosecution."5 6 Such organizations could theo-
retically take many forms." What made them dangerous was not their form
but their capacities - their crime-committing ability." The new standard thus
53. Consider the muddled saga of People v. Western Express, 19 N.Y.3 d 652 (2012). The case in-
volved a ring of credit card thieves associated with an otherwise legitimate website. Id. at
654-55. The trial court dismissed the government's enterprise corruption charge, noting that
the criminals used the website as a market and were not organized in any Wakefield-like sys-
tem of authority. Id. at 656. The Appellate Division reversed, pointing out that, however
useful the Wakefield court's system of authority standard might be, it was not actually re-
quired by the text of the statute, and the website did provide a kind of structure. Id. at 657. A
divided Court of Appeals reversed again, declining to endorse either the Wakefield test or the
Appellate Division's disavowal, noting only that whatever organization the thieves had, it
was not robust enough to count as a clear structure. Id. at 66o.
54. People v. Kancharla, 23 N.Y. 3d. 294, 304 (2014).
55. Western Express, 19 N.Y.3 d at 66o (Pigott, J., dissenting).
s6. Id. at 657 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 659-6o.
58. See People v. Keschner, 37 N.E. 3d 690, 702-03 (N.Y. 2015) (Lippman, C.J., dissenting in




seeks to replace Wakefield's flabby formalism with a more principled, functional
approach.
Reconciling the new standard with OCCA's first prong-the need for an
"ascertainable structure"-was relatively straightforward. For example, in one
case involving a materials testing company that appeared to be systematically
faking results," the question before the court was whether the individuals who
perpetrated the crimes constituted a criminal enterprise with an ascertainable
structure even though their only relation to each other was within a legitimate
corporation.60 The court decided they did. It was not necessary, the court ex-
plained, for an alleged criminal enterprise to have a separate hierarchical organ-
ization in addition to that of the legitimate corporation. Rather, it would be
enough if it were "an association possessing a .. . constancy and capacity ex-
ceeding the individual crimes committed under [its] auspices."61 True, a hierar-
chical organization could provide evidence of excess capacity.62 But the key fac-
tor was the capacity, not the chain of command.
The second prong, "continuity," has given the court more trouble. In the
previous twenty years, some New York State courts had turned the Wakefield
"system of authority" standard into a complete "removability test," inspired by
one of Wakefield's progeny, People v. Yarmy.63 In that case, a New York supreme
court justice dismissed enterprise corruption charges against a pair of criminals
who sold guns illegally.64 Their two-man scheme hardly resembled an orga-
nized crime syndicate, but they may have met the "system of authority" test for
ascertainable structure, since their operation relied on Richard Yarmy's person-
al federal firearms license.65 Perhaps looking for an alternative ground to dis-
miss the count, the trial court found that the alleged criminal enterprise lacked
continuity.66 In dismissing the OCCA charge, the court opined that "one im-
orchestrated criminal conduct over a sustained period, and not just to commit one or a few
discrete crimes, it falls within the statute's description and, indeed, its intendment.").
59. Kancharla, 23 N.Y 3 d at 299-302.
6o. Id. at 302.
61. Id. at 304 (quoting Western Express, 19 N.Y 3d at 658).
62. Id. at 305-o6.
63. 651 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1996), abrogated by Keschner, 37 N.E. 3 d 690.
64. Id. at 844.
65. See id. at 845. The Yarmy court held that the two-man team did not have an "ascertainable
structure" as it lacked "any semblance of a hierarchical organization" and such a hierarchical
"organizational structure is critical to establishing an enterprise." But the Yarmy court, too,
erroneously relied on federal RICO prosecutions to reach this conclusion. Id. at 844. OCCA,
of course, makes no mention of a hierarchical organizational structure.
66. Id. at 845.
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portant factor in determining continuity is whether the organization could ex-
ist after the removal - by arrest or otherwise - of any of the participating mem-
ber(s), 67 which the gun-selling operation decidedly could not. Although this
removability test never achieved universal adoption,6 8 it did prove influential.69
The removability test, however, was not good law. It was a far cry from the
language of the statute. And it seemed to suggest that a criminal enterprise that
ended with the arrest of its members might not be a criminal enterprise at all.
At the very least, it created perverse incentives for criminal groups. If a criminal
enterprise simply concentrated all its responsibilities in the hands of a single
individual, would it then no longer count as a criminal enterprise, because that
individual would be irreplaceable?7o
The issue came to a head last summer, when the Court of Appeals was
asked to resolve a split among the state intermediate appellate courts." In Peo-
ple v. Keschner, decided in June 2015, the court struck down the removability
test and applied the excess capacity standard to OCCA's continuity prong. The
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., People v. Guardino, 88o N.Y.S.2d 244, 247 (App. Div. 2009) (ruling that a criminal
enterprise showed the necessary continuity of existence even though it ended upon the ar-
rest of its members).
69. See, e.g., People v. Conigliaro, 737 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that "the
People [in People v. Nappo, 690 N.Y.S.2d 649 (App. Div. 1999), revd on other grounds, 729
N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 2000), had] failed to establish ... any continuity of existence wherein the
said entity was capable of continuing without the participation [of the defendants],' citing
to Yarmy); People v. Nappo, 690 N.Y.S.2d 649 (App. Div. 1999) (dismissing a charge of en-
terprise corruption, citing to Yarmy), revd on other grounds, 729 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 2000);
People v. Pustilnik, 2007 WL 674116, at *8 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2007) (unreported disposition)
(noting that OCCA's continuity prong was satisfied for a given criminal enterprise since
" [s] ufficient evidence in the Grand Jury demonstrated the continuity of the criminal enter-
prise even if a different member were to have replaced one of the defendants,' citing to Yar-
my).
70. Cf Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, People v. Keschner, 37 N.E. 3 d 690
(N.Y. 2015), http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2o15/Junl5/Transcripts/o6ol5
-15-16-Oral-Argument-Transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/9MWE-MZHH] (reporting Judge
Stein asking defendant-appellant's counsel whether "all an organization ... has to do to ex-
empt itself from criminal enterprise liability is to put one guy at the top and [] have him or
her control the whole thing").
71. Compare People v. Keschner, 973 N.Y.S.2d 7, 11 (App. Div. 2013) (departing from the Second
Department of the Appellate Division in Conigliaro insofar as that decision had endorsed
Yarmy by "holding that the involvement of one or more irreplaceable participants removes
an organization from the statutory definition of 'criminal enterprise"'), with Conigliaro, 737
N.Y.S.2d at 97 (arguably endorsing Yarmy by construing a prior dismissal of an enterprise
corruption charge as having rested, in part, on the People's failure to establish that the al-





case concerned a medical clinic, which was organized to systematically generate
fraudulent billings. 72 Although many different members of the clinic partici-
pated in the criminal scheme, a quirk of New York State law made one of the
doctors indispensable.7 ' The court held that this did not bar finding the clinic
to be a criminal enterprise. To establish continuity, it concluded, it would not
be necessary to show that a criminal enterprise could "survive [] the removal of
a key participant." 4 Instead,
the requirement is ... that [the group] continues to exist beyond indi-
vidual criminal incidents. A team of people who unite to carry out a
single crime or a brief series of crimes may lack structure and criminal
purpose beyond the criminal actions they carry out; such an ad hoc
group is not a criminal enterprise. If a group persists, however, in the
form of a structured, purposeful criminal organization beyond the time
required to commit individual crimes, the continuity element of crimi-
nal enterprise is met.75
Taken together, these cases have revised the meaning of OCCA's two crimi-
nal enterprise prongs. To satisfy them now, prosecutors need not worry about
establishing authoritative reporting lines or stepladders of criminal advance-
ment. Rather, they must prove only that a group of people could have commit-
ted more crimes than they did, and that they continued to exist as a distinct
group with a shared goal even when they were not in the act of committing
those crimes.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS' SOLUTION CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
FOR THE DOCTRINE
The new excess capacity standard is an improvement. It gives New York
courts greater guidance than they had from Wakefield, moves away from im-
proper reliance on federal law, and is more responsive to OCCA's text and pur-
pose. However, this jurisprudential correction remains incomplete. As it
stands, the Court of Appeals' enterprise corruption jurisprudence still suffers
from two problems: it continues to sanction prosecutions that the statute bars,
though to a lesser degree than Wakefield, and it undermines principles of notice
72. Keschner, 37 N.E.3 d at 691-93.
73. Medical clinics in New York State can only be owned by a licensed M.D. Id. at 692.
74. Id. at 691.
75. Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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and legality. OCCA's sponsors made clear that it was meant neither to criminal-
ize behavior otherwise appropriately covered by the New York State Penal Law,
nor to attach to most traditional white-collar criminal schemes.7 6 This inten-
tion was not only reported in the legislative history but was also incorporated
into the actual text of the law." These limitations had been operationalized
largely through the narrow definition of a criminal enterprise.7 ' However, the
Wakefield court dismantled those protections, and the Court of Appeals' recent
decisions have not fully restored them. As interpreted by the court, OCCA still
does not do what its own text calls for.
This risks over-criminalization. Although less broad than Wakefield, even
the new, more functional standard covers whole categories of cases that do not
pose the special problems for law enforcement that OCCA targeted. This has
both philosophical and practical effects. On the philosophical level, it means
that we are punishing defendants for conduct that we do not actually believe to
be criminal. Where criminals collaborate to commit several crimes, for in-
stance, to punish them for enterprise corruption instead of simply the underly-
ing predicate acts is to make a judgment that the association itself represents a
special kind of additional harm worth punishing. But the new standard, on its
own, does not guarantee that the law will only be used to punish such associa-
tions. For example, in many bribery-related public corruption situations, the
actors are repeat players - such as lobbyists and contractors - who continue to
exist as a recognizable group because of their professional identities, even when
they are not in the act of committing crimes. Furthermore, public officials will
always have "excess capacity" by virtue of their office. Consequently, they are
likely to always meet the requirements for a charge of enterprise corruption
under this new standard. However, not every bribe-taking public official has
done a wrong beyond that already punished under traditional public corrup-
tion crimes. If they have not, they should not be indictable under OCCA. The
new standard, however, seems to allow it.
76. See, e.g., Letter from Miller, supra note 16, at 2.
77. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.oo (McKinney 2016) (legislative findings); accord People v. Morris,
No. 0025/09, 201o N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3484, at *78 (Sup. Ct. July 29, 2010) (unreported dis-
position) (noting that a given provision of OCCA was "both a legislative finding and an en-
acted portion of the Penal Law and therefore bind[ing on] this Court as any other relevant
Penal Law provision").
78. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
79. These include larceny, scheming to defraud, defrauding the government, filing false instru-
ments, official misconduct, giving and receiving bribes, giving and receiving rewards for
official misconduct, giving and receiving unlawful gratuities, giving and receiving bribes for




On a practical level, then, this may transform OCCA from a tool for target-
ing otherwise hard-to-reach forms of criminality into a mechanism for enhanc-
ing penalties and easing prosecutors' work. OCCA gives prosecutors another
powerful weapon with which to compel plea bargains from certain defendants:
the threat of indictment for an additional class B felony. A corrupt public offi-
cial from the earlier example could find herself risking twenty-five years in jail
where, in OCCA's absence, she would have faced only minimal jail time for the
less serious underlying offenses.so This can create a powerful incentive to plead
to one or several of the predicate acts, and one that can be easily abused."
While bribe-taking public officials are not "natural objects of moral or political
sympathy,"82 this is no reason to subject them to heightened penalties at the
whim of a prosecutor or to ease the state's burden in proving its case.
More troublingly, the new standard has put the doctrine into tension with
two fundamental principles of criminal law: notice and legality. Defendants are
sition of authority, and the crime of corrupting the government, which is a crime of its own
and an aggravating factor. See generally PENAL §§ 155, 175, 190, 195, 200, 496.
This is not to say that New York's anti-corruption laws are adequate. See
Kathleen Rice et al., Preliminary Report, COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE PUB. CORRUPTION
85-97 (Dec. 2, 2013), http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/sites/default/files/moreland
-report final.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD9E-SEZC] (detailing problems with New York
State's current anti-corruption penal laws and recommending substantial reforms). But the
inadequacies in New York's public corruption laws documented by the Moreland Commis-
sion may not be the kind easily reached by enterprise corruption prosecutions.
8o. Compare PENAL § 460.20 (noting that "enterprise corruption is a class B felony"), with id.
§ 460.10.1 (listing predicate criminal acts, including some nonviolent class D and E felo-
nies).
si. Upsettingly, this effect of OCCA would largely escape public accountability, since it would
keep cases out of court and would not show up in the plea deal or charging instruments.
Only a study of prosecutors' archives or careful comparisons of the sentences that followed
after plea deals or trials for similarly situated defendants would let us know whether -and to
what extent -this was happening. For studies along these lines, see, for example, Jamie
Fellner, An Offer You Can't Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants To Plead
Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports
/usl213_ForUpload o-o-o.pdf [http://perma.cc/F85H-EJ3N], which uses detailed report-
ing to explore the power of plea deals and the penalty defendants pay for going to trial; and
Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and
Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2012), which uses United States Department of Justice da-
tasets to look at the relationship between the charge sheet, the underlying crimes, plea deals,
and actual sentences.
82. With apologies to Daniel Markovits, see Will the "New Aristocrats" Broker the Deal?, NEW
HAVEN INDEP. (May 25, 2015), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives
/entry/yale_1aw commencement/ [http://perma.cc/3ZER-WNGJ] (quoting Daniel Mar-
kovits, Address at the Yale Law School Commencement: A New Aristocracy (May 18,
2015)).
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at risk of OCCA's penalty enhancements with only minimal notice because the
application of OCCA to their conduct is not the result of any statutory enact-
ment, nor reflected anywhere in New York's codified Penal Law. State case law
applying OCCA remains confused, and, as the only possible source of notice
here, does not give clear guidance either."
This presents two different legality issues. First, if OCCA is used to en-
hance penalties for certain crimes for which the legislature has not specified
penalty enhancements, one law (OCCA) would be used to undercut others.
Prosecutors and courts would be, in effect, encroaching on the legislature's au-
thority to define the severity of crimes by using OCCA to prescribe stricter
punishments for certain crimes than what the legislature had prescribed. This
raises the specter of serious separation-of-powers concerns.
Second, and more concretely, OCCA's text limits it to a narrower range of
circumstances than those in which it may now be used. As judicially elaborated,
the law applies in prosecutions that are beyond the reach of its text. This risks
violating the basic principle of legality, according to which no behavior should
be punished if it is not criminalized. OCCA explicitly limits the reach of enter-
prise corruption to acts in conformity with the legislative findings. But the leg-
islative findings limit OCCA to a smaller set of cases than those covered by the
court's new excess capacity standard. Through an interpretation of a statute,
then, the court risks extending enterprise corruption to conduct that the legis-
lature pointedly refused to include within its reach.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE: REIGNING IN OCCA THROUGH SECTION
210.40(2) MOTIONS
Luckily, the judiciary already has the tools at its disposal to cabin OCCA. As
part of its initial enactment, OCCA empowered judges to dismiss enterprise
corruption charges "where prosecution of that count [would be] inconsistent
with the stated legislative findings" through a special motion under section
83. For example, even as the Court of Appeals has moved away from the Wakefield approach,
Wakefield continues to be cited in trial court orders, see, e.g., People v. Foster, No.
o63422009, 2011 WL 12842248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2011) (relying in part on Wakefield to
construe enterprise corruption), and appellate court briefs, see, e.g., Reply Brief for Defend-
ant-Appellant-Respondent, People v. Barone, 14 N.E. 3 d 354 (N.Y. 2014) (No. APL-2o13-
00013), 2014 WL 2117928 (also relying on Wakefield to construe enterprise corruption). As
Stephen Skowronek and Karen Orren have noted in a different context, succeeding institu-
tions, such as legal tests, do not usually displace one another in neat succession, but rather
coexist uneasily, in tension and partial contradiction, in a phenomenon they call "intercur-
rence." KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DE-




210.40(2) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.8 4 This device, however,
has seldom been used. One New York supreme court has opined that it should
be limited to "shield[ing] a minor cog in the criminal machinery, such as a low
level operative, or one who was involved only in a small portion of the criminal
activities, from the strong penalties" of an enterprise corruption conviction,"
drastically and unjustifiably limiting section 210.40(2) motions' scope. Courts
have been reluctant to grant such motions at all;8 6 the Court of Appeals has
never issued one.8 7
Reviving this mechanism could fix some of the problems with the new ju-
risprudence of the Court of Appeals by restoring protections for defendants
and giving courts a tool to limit OCCA's overbreadth. The Court of Appeals
should encourage New York courts to deploy section 210.40(2) motions to en-
sure that prosecutors are using OCCA in line with the law's intention. This,
after all, is what OCCA requires, and is, according to the text of the New York
Criminal Procedure Law, the purpose section 210.40(2) motions serve." Those
intentions include preventing enterprise corruption charges from attaching to
low-level operatives, as the New York supreme court noted. But they also in-
clude limiting the law's reach to criminal enterprises whose leaders might not
otherwise face prosecution for the full extent of their crimes. This doubtless
covers many criminal schemes without Mafia connections," but it should not
reach ordinary white-collar crimes, particularly run-of-the-mill political cor-
ruption.
84. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(2) (McKinney 2016).
85. People v. Morris, No. 0025/09, 201o N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3484, at *78 (Sup. Ct. July 29, 2010)
(unreported disposition).
86. See, e.g., People v. Basbus, 889 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. Div. 2009); People v. Joseph Stevens &
Co., No. 2394/2009, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2152 (Sup. Ct. May 2, 2011) (unreported dispo-
sition). For an important exception, see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
87. At least none that I could find. The practice guides reach the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, § 36:8 (noting that it "remains to be seen ... whether
[New York] appellate courts will develop their own jurisprudence" around section 210.40(2)
motions).
88. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.oo (McKinney 2016) (stating legislative findings); CRIM. PROC.
§ 210.40(2) ("[A] count alleging enterprise corruption in violation of article four hundred
sixty of the penal law may be dismissed in the interest of justice where prosecution of that
count is inconsistent with the stated legislative findings in said article.").
89. For a contemporary, appropriate, non-Mafia white-collar example, see the recent enterprise
corruption indictments of Narco Freedom, Inc. A.G. Schneiderman Announces Indictment of
Nonprofit Narco Freedom and Its Top Executives for Participating in an Organized Crime Ring,
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The advantages to this judicial solution are many. It would allow for a
timely fix to the law without relying on the often-dysfunctional New York State
Assembly. And it would keep courts and lawmakers from getting bogged down
in defining new categorical tests, replacing a sterile exercise in line drawing
with an act of judicial evaluation. Most beneficially, it would create an oppor-
tunity for courts to consider the real question underlying the use of OCCA:
whether a given non-Mafia criminal enterprise is nevertheless similar to an or-
ganized crime syndicate in the way that it resists traditional prosecution. If it is,
then the use of an enterprise corruption charge is in keeping with OCCA's
aims, and so within the statute. If not, then other criminal laws should already
be adequate to punish the conduct.
The practicability of this solution is apparent from the unique practice of
New York Supreme Court Justice Bernard Fried. Apparently alone among New
York State trial court judges, Justice Fried has used section 210.40(2) motions
to dismiss enterprise corruption counts where, in his judgment, the indictment
was not in keeping with the purposes of the statute. 0 In particular, he has ar-
gued for dismissing enterprise corruption counts where there are otherwise
"adequate sanctions and remedies available to punish and deal with the con-
duct involved," as those are the cases to which the legislative findings sought to
limit OCCA's "enhanced sanctions."" Since the Criminal Procedure Law makes
it clear that a New York State court can grant section 210.40(2) motions sua
sponte if necessary,92 nothing prevents trial courts from following Justice Fried's
lead-though this practice could be encouraged by guidance from the Court of
Appeals.
It might be objected that greater use of section 210.40(2) motions would
simply perpetuate doctrinal confusion, by allowing judges to make ad hoc deci-
sions based on their own discretion. This is an understandable fear. However,
it ignores the extent to which the legislative findings incorporated into OCCA
go. See, e.g., People v. D.H. Blair & Co., No. 3282/2000, 2002 WL 766119, at *15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 29, 2002) (Fried, J.) (citing People v. Andreadakis, Ind., No. 9691/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995)).
91. People v. Demenus, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 13, 1995, at 29, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also D.H. Blair & Co., 2002 WL 766119, at *15 (discussing Justice Fried's
use of section 210.40 (2) motions in earlier decisions).
92. See CRIM. PROC § 210.40(3).
93. Accord GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, § 36:8 ("It remains to be seen whether meaningful
standards will be developed for determining when dismissal of an enterprise corruption
charge in the interest of justice is warranted, and whether the appellate courts will develop
their own jurisprudence for deciding when dismissing (or refusing to dismiss) an enterprise




already give judges concrete guidance. Whether a given factual situation fits
within OCCA's purposes is too complicated a question to be answered by a
simple bright-line test. But it is not beyond judicial cognizance - not in the es-
timation of the legislature, which assigned that task to the courts when it creat-
ed section 210.40(2) motions as part of its enactment of OCCA; nor is it be-
yond the competence of the judiciary in the judgment of the courts themselves,
which regularly evaluate whether to dismiss indictments "in the interest of jus-
tice" in other cases. 94 As an added protection, section 210.40(2) motions are
presumptively reviewable for abuse of discretion by appellate courts,9' enabling
the New York judiciary to create and maintain uniform standards. By endors-
ing Justice Fried's approach, encouraging other New York Supreme Court Jus-
tices to follow suit, and, over time, articulating standards for the use of section
210.40(2) motions, the Court of Appeals could make sure that its recent deci-
sions ultimately enhance OCCA, rather than explode it.
CONCLUSION
As this Comment has shown, OCCA sought to strike a balance between
prosecuting exceptional dangers and respecting defendants' rights. In the dec-
ades after its enactment, New York courts expanded the law's reach, upsetting
its equipoise. As a result, and despite the recent efforts of the New York Court
of Appeals, OCCA remains out of balance. It no longer fulfills the intentions of
its drafters. Its application is in tension with its own statutory text. And it rais-
es fundamental issues of notice and legality while courting overcriminalization.
Fortunately, New York courts have the resources at their disposal to address
these concerns. By following the practice of the heretofore-overlooked Justice
Fried and reinvigorating section 210.40(2) motions, they could set the law
aright.
This readjustment may have significance beyond New York. Many states
have their own "baby RICO" statutes, and commentators have long worried
about possible overreach under those laws as well. 96 justice Fried's practice
could provide a way for judges in states with statutes like New York's to curb
94. See, e.g., CRIM. PROC. § 210.40(1) and accompanying notes of decision.
95. 34 GLENDA K. HARNAD & TAMMY E. HINSHAW, CARMODY-WAIT NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH
FORMS § 189:165 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that the Court of Appeals may review an order dis-
missing an indictment in the interest of justice for abuse of discretion as a matter of law).
96. See 8 JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 96:98 (3d ed. 2015) (listing state RICO statutes); Reichelt, supra note 14, at 266-70 (dis-
cussing arguments for limiting state RICO).
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the law without relying on prosecutorial discretion or new legislation." On a
more abstract level, this approach offers a model for how courts can work col-
laboratively with legislatures to actualize legislative intent where those legisla-
tors have explicitly enshrined their intent in statute. This avoids troublesome
debates about "purposivism" and "textualism" to bring courts back to one of
their core functions: opening a space in which to figure out how to properly
apply the law to facts. As OCCA's drafters themselves recognized, categorical
lines would not properly bound those circumstances deserving of OCCA's
heightened penalties." In any given use of the enterprise corruption statute,
there will be a question about whether the defendants were engaged in the
kind of activity that the law sought to reach. That is a question that deserves
real briefing. Through the use of section 210.40(2) motions, the New York ju-
diciary could make sure it, too, gets its day in court.
NOAH A. ROSENBLUM*
97. Cf Reichelt, supra note 14, at 270-72 (proposing prosecutorial discretion and new legislative
enactments to curb state RICO laws).
98. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.oo (McKinney 2016) ("The balance intended to be struck by this
act cannot readily be codified in the form of restrictive definitions or a categorical list of ex-
ceptions.").
* J.D./Ph.D. Candidate, Yale Law School & Columbia University, Department of History. For
comments, suggestions, and encouragement, thank you to Abigail Fradkin, Geoffrey Shaw,
Jihee Suh, Jacob Victor, Alice Wang, Katie Wynbrandt, and Jarret Zafran. Special thanks to
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